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obeying and conforming to those laws we can secure ourselves
life and happiness; while by opposing and transgressing their
teaching we have our punishment in death and misery. The
true place of the Sublime in the scheme of our faculties is next to
the regulative and directive ethical feeling3 : though it forms a
connecting link between these and the eesthetic sense in its
proper acceptation.
G E A U T AI.I.MM.
IV.—INTUITION AND INFERENCE.
I.—INTUITION.
THE meaning of the term Intuition and the scope and limits
of the mental capabilities represented thereby have long been
unsettled in philosophical speculation. Of so much importance
has the name become that its adjective characterises a distinct
(or supposed distinct) school in philosophy, whose members
claim a proper extension of the denomination beyond what is
allowed by their antagonists. With almost all Intuitionalists
the name Intuition covers much more than their oppouents allow
that it can include; in what respects they make such an
extension we shall presently see. The applications of the term
Inference have not been subject to so much doubt and uncertainty
as have those of Intuition, though, indeed, it should be said that
the fundamental facts of inferential knowledge are not yet so
completely laid bare as to leave nothing further for the explorer
to do. Intuition and Inference usually are contrasted with each
other as being two separate and antithetical modes of mental
experience. Intuition is generally referred to as primary and
fundamental, while Inference is accounted secondary and super-
structive. But as far as one has been made dependent upon the
other, mankind has been disposed to measure Inference by
Intuition rather than Intuition by Inference. Intuition has been
regarded as a source of or method of obtaining transcendental,
pure, and trustworthy knowledge; while Inference has been
esteemed to yield only experiential, mixed, and uncertain
information. Intuition is thus held to be the more important,
partly because the knowledge it gives is considered to be
primary and partly because that knowledge is deemed more
clear and certain. Another and very potent reason for the
empressement with wliich Intuition has been treated lies in the
fact that men have been alive to the convenience of possessing a
standard superior to and independent of Inference, to which they
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.might appeal when bias or interest called for the establishment
of a point and inferential processes failed to yield the desired
results. Deeming it a matter of importance, therefore, to
ascertain, if possible, the true significations of these words and
to analyse the mental acts, states, or products for which they
stand, we will devote some pages to such a task.
Upon one thing in regard to Intuition the philosophers have
been almost universally agreed, namely, that we do cognise by
Intuition the phenomena of the external world and the
phenomena of our own minds. Whether in seeing a tree we
cognise anything more than the phenomenal qualities, and, if we
do, whether we cognise intuitively or inferentially, are questions
in regard to which there has been dispute, and which are not
altogether easy of settlement; but as to the phenomena there is
no question and can be none, save in the misunderstandings of
people who, like Dr Johnson, think they are refuting Berkeley
by kicking a stone. Nobody has been found, I believe, to set
forth that we know phenomena otherwise than by Intuition.
Accordingly in this investigation of the meaning of the term and
the sources and nature of the power, we may take our departure
from this point, looking for the essential import of the name in
that to which by universal consent it is correctly applied,
and leaving for subsequent elucidation the extent and confines of
its proper employment.
Etymologically considered, the word Intuition means a
beholding, and it usually has been construed to designate an
immediate belwlding. This immediacy of cognition seems to be
the essential character of an intuition. There is nothing
intervening between the cognising mind and the object of
cognition; the mind looks directly upon that object. I move my
arm: I am conscious directly of the movement Something strikes
my foot: I cognise the pain immediately. A ray of light
reaches my eye: I apprehend the colour without any intervening
medium. I close my eyes and reflect; I remember what
happened yesterday: that there is a mental action I am aware
immediately; in having an idea I know that I have an idea, at
once and indubitably. All these are instances of presentative
phenomenal cognitions ; thus out of the fact in regard to which
all thinkers are consentient we obtain for Intuition both illustra-
tion and definition. It is perhaps allowable to assume here that
the immediacy is the essence of the term in all cases where the
cognitions though not presentative are claimed to be and are called
intuitive. It is said, for instance, that we know Being intui-
tively, meaning that we know it in the clearest and completest
manner in which we know anything, that is to say, immediately.
For we know what we know intuitively "without the inter-
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vention of any other idea"; and, to quote further the words of
Locke—" this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain
that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is
irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself immediately to
be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns that way; and leaves
no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is
presently filled with the clear light of it. 'Tis on this intuition
that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge,
which certainly every one finds to be so great that he cannot
imagine, and therefore not require a greater."* If then it be
allowed (and it will hardly be disputed) that by intuitive is
meant " the clearest and most certain" knowledge, and that such
knowledge is the clearest and moat certain as is cognised
"without the intervention of any other idea," immediateness
may be accepted as a criterion of intuitive cognition, and Intui-
tion may be defined as " immediate beholding". It is hence
apparent that the question to be settled in a given case of doubt
as to whether anything is an intuition or not, is simply whether
the given object is cognised immediately or mediately: if the
former the cognition is intuitive, if the latter it is not intuitive.
What cognitions then are immediate ? At least all cognitions
so far forth as they are presentative : if such are not immediate,
no cognitions are immediate, and the word is destitute of mean-
ing, in discussing representative cognitions (MIND, NO. X, p.
270) it has been noticed that they have in -a marked degree both
a presentative and a representative side. In their presentative
aspect, they are ideas as phenomena irrespective of their signifi-
cation; as representative, they are reproductions of former
experience known as such. I think of a rose seen yesterday and
not now present: this idea of a rose is a presentative experience
in so far as it is a mere mental phenomenon; that I have this
idea I cognise immediately ; but in so far as I cognise the idea
as a representation of yesterday's experience, the cognition is
representative, and such a cognition of the prior experience is
effected through the medium of the present idea. In representa-
tive cognition, therefore, so far forth as it is representative, we
must be said to re-cognise a fact through the intervention of a
present-idea. Representative cognition is hence mediate.
In the distinction between presentative and representative
knowledge lies the entire difference .between immediate and
mediate cognition, and thus between intuitions and those
cognitions which are not intuitive. Just here lies the solution of
the whole difficulty in wliich metaphysics has been involved
over intuitive and non-intuitive knowledge. It is the neglect of
this distinction and the want of a sufficient understanding of the
• Locke : Etsay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV., ch. 2, $1.
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growth of representative cognition, its differentiations and
redintegrations, that has led men to such contradictory and con-
fused notions of the meaning of Intuition. It is attention to this
difference and careful association of intuition with presentative
knowledge and non-intuition with representative, that will alone
keep the mind free from confusion upon this topic. To the
extent that a cognition is presentative, it is intuitive; in the de-
gree that it is representative, it is not intuitive. In order to
make this truth plainer, and to support it, we will now review
the different degrees of presentative and representative
cognitions in greater detail, and after such an examination we
shall be able, as there arises occasion, to note the aberrations of
philosophers on the subject, seeing how and where they have
departed from the narrow path, adherence to which (in my
judgment) can alone save the traveller from becoming entangled
in a pathless maze. ,
But a word is needed in this place in regard to the co-ordinate
subject of this essay. If Inference be opposed to Intuition, so
that the two exclude each other, the former must be separated
from presentative cognition and ranked with representative.
And this 6eems presumptively the proper course to take.
Certainly when we infer a thing we do not behold it immediately,
but mediately; and when we intuite any object we do not infer
anything so far as we intuite it. Inference may take place
collaterally, but that which is intuition is outside and exclusive
of whatever inference there may be. Yet we are not at present
prepared to say that inference is co-extensive with representative
cognition ; for though it appears that every inference is mediate
cognition, it is not yet evident that every mediate cognition is
an inference.
Leaving the subject of Inference, however, for subsequent
treatment, let us now examine some intuitions and so-called
intuitions. It will readily be admitted that cognition" is almost
wholly intuitive in the lowest grade of presentative cognition,
wherein the mind occupies itself with localising on the body a
single sensation, as a burn on the hand. The sensation of the
pain in the member is apprehended intellectually by intuition;
the representative element is least evident. But even in these
simplest intuitions the question meets us—What is it we im-
mediately behold ? If it be replied that we intuite the sensation,
it is necessary to know what is the sensation. So far as it is
feeling, we feel it; so far as it is cognition, and subject to
analysis, we may ascertain the elements of which the cognition
is composed. In a preceding essay (" Knowledge and Belief,"
MIND, NO. IX) it lias been found that every act of knowing fand
believing as well) involves certain fundamental relations present
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and cognised; the relations of -which we are conscious are
Agreement, Difference, Time, Representation, and Power, these
name3 being general expressions to designate the relations
cognised in every act of knowing. We have an intuition of things
involving these relations. We do not immediately cog-
nise agreement in general, difference in general, time in
general, and so forth, but we behold intuitively an object pre-
sented as the same with itself, as different from another beside
it, as continuing, and as succeeding or preceding another. By
analysis we discover these general and fundamental constituents of
every cognition; that is, we discover them by reflection, which is to
say, mediately. What we intuite is in each case certain sensations
cognised by ourselves. In each individual experience we have
an intuition of something agreeing with something, something
differing from something, something represented, something con-
tinuing, and something succeeding something, while in the con-
sciousness of something we have also what has been termed
consciousness of power, active and passive; but the expressions by
wliich we describe these experiences mark generalisations which
are not intuitive.
It must not escape attention that there exists also from the
very dawn of consciousness, even in the cognitions most charac-
teristically presentative, an element of representation which is
not immediate. Every item of conscious experience requires
representation in order that there may be any continuity of ex-
perience. Hence there are no unmixed intuitions; intuition is
succeeded by representation and the conversa Intuitive cog-
nitions alone would be like flashes of lightning in the night,
for a moment illuminating, but after an instant going out, and
leaving only thick darkness. Where the representative con-
stituent is less prominent than the presentative the cognition
may be called prevailingly intuitive, but in all cases there is an
element not intuitiva
Since in all cognition there is a discrimination between self
and not-self, between the phenomena of mind and not-mind, it
follows that at every instant of conscious experience we intuite
a difference between the Ego and the Non-Ego. It is important
that the character of this intuition be not misunderstood. In
describing an intuition we are forced to use language which
makes a cognition not immediate but mediate; we can only
treat of immediate cognitions by mediate ones; we can know
that we have presentative experience only by representative
cognition. The cognition signified by the term Ego embraces a
series of experiences terminating at the present moment; equally
so the cognition made manifest by the name Non-Ego. If we
speak of knowing the Ego and the Non-Ego by intuition, we
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shall be almost certain to err unless we keep in mind this fact
We do not know by intuition that the Ego of to-day is the Ego of
yesterday, nor that the Ego of yesterday is different from the
Non-Ego of to-day, nor that the Ego of yesterday is different
from the Non-Ego of yesterday; for such knowledge is dependent
upon representation. We merely cognise intuitively at each
successive moment of time, so small as to be definitely inappre-
ciable, that Ego am other than Non-Ego. In no way different
is the discrimination intuitively made between the phenomena
which connect directly with the external world and those which
ap^rtain exclusively or concurrently to mind. Whatever in-
tuitions we have of space, matter, force, time, and motion, are
intuitions only of space, matter, force, time, and motion, as in
and composing each external object or phenomenon we cognise.
From moment to moment we have intuitions, presentative ex-
periences, which representation discovers to involve these rela-
tions. We have no intuition of space in general, force in general,
motion in general, but only intuitions of something extended,
something resisting, something moving. We shall have occasion
to refer to these cognitions of space, force, motion, &c., in a sub-
sequent paragraph, and till then we will dismiss them from con-
sideration.
We now pass to a higher grade of presentative cognitions,
namely, those in which a plurality of sensation is distinguished
and localised upon the body. How far do we cognise intuitively
the prick of a pin upon the hand and the simultaneous impact
of a stone or block of wood upon the foot, supposing that neither
of the two sensations is so intense as to overpower the other, nor
so faint as to be unheeded in the presence of the other ? The
answer to this question is implicated in the reply to be given to
the more general query—What is co-existence ? The answer to
the latter interrogation is perhaps not yet to be considered settled.
It seems to have been pretty well made out, however, that co-
existence is but a form of succession. In such a view a cognition
made up of two simultaneous sensations would have in its com-
position a larger amount of representation than where a single
sensation is cognised. For, in order to sustain the two together,
a representative cognition must alternate with a presentative in
very close succession: while sensation A is present sensation B
must be represented in association, and while sensation B is
occupying present attention there must be a mental reproduction
of sensation A in contiguity therewith; the mind passes from A
to B and from B to A, giving specific present attention to each
in turn and losing sight of neither. In the cognition of co-
existent phenomena there is accordingly an additional grain of
representation over the preceding case, and hence a less amount
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of intuition. But if, on the other hand, it finally be made evi-
dent that co-existence is not resolvable ultimately into succession,
but that the mind actually and literally can apprehend two
things at the same time, the intuition involved in the cognition
of co-existent sensations would be of precisely the same character
and in precisely the same degree as in the inferior grade (in
complaxity) of presentative cognitions which was noticed in
paragraphs just preceding; the amount of representation relatively
to the amount of presentation would be the same in both in-
stances.
A still more complex degree of cognition occurs in the per-
ception of external object^ . In viewing a book lying on the
table I do not see the under side of it at all, yet I am perfectly
well assured that if I turn the book on the edge I should see
something substantially like what I now see. I have an intuition
of the upper surface, but I mentally complete the book by re-
producing my past experience of the structure and form of
books. When therefore I say I intuite a book before me (if such
a verb may be formed), I do not speak correctly. The proportion
of representation in the cognition is not so large as when I think
of a book, none being before me, yet it is considerably larger than
when I apprehend a pain in my head, or a pain in my head and
the pleasurable odour of a rose co-existently or successively.
Therefore, in perceiving whole objects in nature, I cognise a
portion immediately and with this immediate cognition I cognise
another part mediately. Perception of objects is hence partially
intuition and partially not intuition. Of course, where there is
a plurality of objects cognised, there is an increase of complexity
in the cognition, but the relative proportion of immediate and
mediate cognition remains about the same; at any rate, what-
ever difference there may be is not of a sufficiently distinctive
character, in kind, to need more particular explanation.
In the case of ideas considered as mental phenomena irrespec-
tive of their representative aspect, the same line of observation
may be pursued. Every such cognition is immediate or mediate
according as it is viewed; there is a sort of double consciousness
which has not been resolved into anything more ultimate—so to
speak, a consciousness of presentation and a consciousness of re-
presentation. But even when we are regarding an idea simply
as a phenomenon, the peculiarity must be noted that even on
the presentative side there is also representation, else the idea
could not continue as an idea but would be evanescent and in-
cognisable.
Having now run over the different ranks of presentative cog-
nitions, let us turn to those characteristically representative, in
order that we may have opportunity to see in greater detail what
2 3 2 5
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cognitions cannot in any sense be said to be intuitions. The
simplest representative cognitions need not detain us long.
Recollections of events or trains of events, appearances or col-
lections of appearances, are not intuitive. In remembering a
man whom I met on the street the other day, in recalling the
features of a landscape I saw last summer, in reviewing the
scenes of my school-days, in reproducing in idea as well as I am
able the pains of a fit of sickness or the delights of a coricert or
spectacle, I have no intuition, but only a mediate cognition of
the past experience. These things are matters of remembrance
or recollection; nobody claims that the name intuition is appli-
cable to them (excepting always the consideration of these cog-
nitions simply as ideas).
Eepresentative cognitions, wherein parts of experiences are
transposed and transferred from one connexion to another, but
so preserved in their integrity as to be traceable and recog-
nisable, exemplify a higher degree of complexity in cognition,
but exhibit nothing essentially different from the last case as
regards the points now under consideration. There may be in
my room a bust of Washington and one of Lincoln, and I can very
readily imagine the Washington head on the Lincoln shoulders
or vice versd. It is evident, however, in my mind that the head
1 put on Lincoln's shoulders in idea is a representation of the
head which I have seen on the Washington bust. I simply
make a constructive junction of two mediate cognitions. There
is no intuition but the intuition of an idea of a bust made up as
aforesaid. In all the varieties of representative cognitions thus
far noticed, there is no disagreement among philosophers as to
the fact that the cognitions are not intuitive.
Advancing a little further in the course of the elaboration of
knowledge, we meet with combinations of parts and wholes of
experience into new wholes, forming what are known as general
and abstract notions. These may occur alone or in couples,
which unite cognitions of varying generalities in judgments. At
to the character of general and abstract notions, there have
existed wide differences of opinion. Some thinkers have con-
sidered them to be intuitions par eminence, while admitting
their generality and abstractness; others have denominated
some particular cognitions of this class intuitions, while they
have denied the name to the fellows of these cognitions. Corres-
pondingly, those judgments which express general knowledge
have often been called intuitive, and it seems as if the higher
and more far-reaching the generality the more confidently the
term has been applied. In fact, nearly all cognition whatever
reaching in complexity beyond that characterised in the last
paragraph, has at some time and by some one been dubbed in-
2 3
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tuitionaL But all those cognitions which are marked by general
and abstract names, even those indicated by the names Being,
Time, Space, Substance, Motion, Power, Force, The Infinite, The
Absolute, The Beautiful, The True, The Good, and the like, are
reached by abstraction and generalisation; they are thus represen-
tative, hence mediate, hence not intuitive. This conclusion, how-
ever, does not determine whether or not they are innate, necessary,
or universal. That such cognitions have been held intuitive is
owing to the fact that thinkers have failed to apprehend the
difference (or to keep it before them) of an act of present appre-
hension and the results of remembering, connecting, abstracting
from, and generalising such acts; also to the fact that thinkers
from a hazy, mystical habit of thought, from the fear of conse-
quences to some of their prejudices, and from a want of careful
observation and profound analysis, have been led to assume the
existence of a super-sensible undefined faculty of the mind to
see by " the mind's eye" what they have crudely imagined ought
to be seen, or what they would like to have seen.
We may be asked here what disposition is to be made of
axioms ? The whole is greater than a part; Two straight lines
cannot enclose a space; If equals are added to'equals the sums will
he equal, will be cited. The answer to be given to such queries
is that axioms are generalisations or expressive of generalisa-
tions. If the first proposition were This whole now before me is
greater than its part, we might consider that the cognition repre-
sented by the phrase was intuitive, but as the axiom stands (and
if it were not in that form it would not be an axiom), the mean-
ing is not the whole before me, but all wholes that I have ever
seen or shall see, all wholes in fact that anybody has seen or can
conceive of. Now, without discussing the origin of such cog-
nitions as are called axiomatic, it may at least be asserted gene-
rally that our cognition of their truth is not a matter of know-
ledge but of belief. We believe that all wholes are and will be
found to be greater than their parts. We associate together in
thought a number of wholes. But association and belief are not
allied to immediate cognition; belief is always mediate cognition.
Similar observations may be made of the other axioms men-
tioned ; also of any others that might be mentioned. They are
generalisations from experiences which are intuitive, but are not
themselves the experiences. To call them intuitions is to con-
found important distinctions of knowledge, and work confusion.
Dismissing the axioms, it may be observed that in comparing
objects and referring them to classes, or in cognising objects as
comprehended under classes, as when we say Trees are green,
Apples are sweet and sour, Man is mortal, the predicates are
always highly representative and the subjects may be so. The
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prevailing character of the cognition, is thus representative and
mediate, and the knowledge as a product is mediate. Here we
shall probably have no one to contradict us. And much more is
such a characterisation applicable to chains of reasoning as
syllogisms. Eeasoning is held by all to be mediate cognition.
But in passing to the highest grade of representative cognitions,
wherein general notions and particular cognitions are combined
in forms making highly complex wholes which have no corre-
spondent reality, in maintaining that intuition is absent except
as to the ideas considered as phenomena,' we might again en-
counter opposition from those esteeming that man has a " reason"
or " intellectual intuition ". Many think their visions are reve-
lations of a reality transcending experience. Some religious
enthusiasts would claim that their imaginative flights in the
portrayal of the glories of God's kingdom are intuitive cognitions
of supermundane realities. Such descriptions as those given in
the Apocalypse of St. John might be cited as examples. Whe-
ther or not there may be realities of which the luxuriant imagery
of the Book of Revelation is symbolical, is a question open to
debate, but it is perfectly obvious that, while as wholes these
descriptions do not raise cognitions corresponding to experience,
they are composed of elements which experience affords. The
parts of the pictures are parts of remembered experiences; the
terms used to describe the wholes have primary reference to ex-
perience and derive their meaning from experience. The repre-
sentative character of such cognitions thus appears plainly
enough, and while it may be possible that what they image may
become presentative, that they are immediate cognitions of
realities, seen intuitively, cannot soberly be maintained for an
instant.
Having now reviewed the several classes of cognitions, we
have seen what are intuitions and what are not intuitions; and
while no cognition is wholly intuition we have observed in what
ones the intuitive character is sufficiently prevailing to warrant
applying the name intuition to the whole. The poet says that
" Knowledge is of things we see." * In these words) when
properly interpreted, there is the soundest philosophy. I know
of no more important reform required in the use of terms as
affecting thought than the restoration of the words intuition and
intuitive to their proper and original signification. It is a reform
imperatively demanded. Unless they can be rescued from such
uses as they are made to subserve when they designate general
notions, they had better be discarded altogether. Undoubtedly
eome will contend, while conceding the primitive meaning of
intuition and intuitive to be what is here set forth, that after all
• Tennyson: In Memoriam.
 at U
niversity of California, Santa Barbara on July 13, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Intuition and Inference. 349
in practical use the words have become so modified as to make
them the most suitable for expressing all fundamental truth.
When a word has acquired a fixed signification, even though
that be quite a different one from its earlier denotation or con-
notation, it is often better, these people would say, to accept the
situation than to try to restore what has been lost. Often, but
not always—and while remark of this kind would be quite true
in many cases, it is nevertheless not pertinent to the present
ona If no reform were made, but the evil practice of which I
am complaining were to become universal, there would still be
need of a distinction to be drawn between presentative know-
ledge and that of representation, and the application of the term
immediate to presentative knowledge would be likely still to
continue. Unless then it can be restricted to presentative
knowledge an- entanglement of meanings is inevitable, for we
could scarcely divest intuition of its meaning of immediateness.
We should all the time, therefore, be confusing presentative
with representative knowledge, but the distinction between the
two lies at the foundation of all scientific classification of pro-
ducts of the intellect, and to obliterate it or confuse it is to de-
stroy or confuse the very science of knowledge. It would be
far easier hence to confine the words in question to their ob-
vious and primary meaning than otherwise to avoid the con-
fusion and trouble sure to result from extending them beyond
this sphere of application. It is certainly worth our while,
therefore, to endeavour to suppress the illegitimate employment
of which I have spoken. It may be suspected that men—not
understanding the nature of belief and not regarding belief as
conveying certitude equally with knowledge, feeling that there
are certain truths necessary and universal and apprehending
also that presentative cognition is vivid, certain and indisput-
able—have, in order to convey and secure the impression that
those necessary truths are equally vivid and certain, appropriated
the terms intuitive and intuition from their reference to presenta-
tive knowledge, to characterise the others. If, however, the mind
can be led to see that we may be as certain of what we believe
as of what we know, and that a truth may be necessary and
universal without being intuitive, we shall perhaps find it less
of a task to persuade people to relegate the name intuition and
its kindred adjective to their original and only justifiable use of
designating cognitions which are characteristically presentative.
DANIEL GBEENLEAF THOMSON.
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